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Thomas Weiskel, Sertoli points out 
that whereas in Kant the subject 
saves itself by separating itself from 
the object; in Wordsworth the subject 
saves itself by identifying with it. But 
Sertoli praises Monk for his sugges-
tive commentary on the fate of the 
sublime from the romantic period to 
Imagism and early Modernism. 
While Modernist poets and critics 
generally rejected the sublime as so 
much nineteenth-century afflatus, 
Monk showed that the sublime had 
injected itself into the notion of aes-
thetic (emotional) "disinterested-
ness". Sertoli writes: "Far from being 
a refusal of subjectivity, then, the 
imagistic objectivism is, on the con-
trary, a purification of it .. .its sublima-
tion." Monk had reinstated romanti-
cism in the literary history of 
modernism-no mean feat in 1935 
when the anti-Romanticism of Eliot 
and Pound was at its zenith. 
Against Monk's model of an organ-
ic unfolding of the idea of the sublime, 
however, Sertoli prefers something on 
the order of The Sublime and its 
Vicissitudes: one may discover a 
classical sublime and a neoclassical sub-
lime, a gothic sublime and a romantic sub-
lime; there is the sublime of Dennis and 
that of Addison, that of Burke and that of 
Karnes, that of Kant and that of Words-
worth ... and no one of them is the 
Sublime. 
This is not to say that a history of the 
subject cannot be traced, only that 
such a history will be marked by 
"plurality" and "difference". The 
"history" of the sublime should con-
firm what David Perkins has argued 
in Is Literary History Possible? (1992): 
the "always unsuccessful attempt of 
every literary history to explain the 
development of literature that it 
describes." 
It is astonishing that the transla-
tor's name, Rachele Garattini, is not 
on the title page, and is only to be 
found on a white label pasted onto 
the back of it. Traduttore-traditore? 
No, translators are not always trai-
tors. Garattini has been loyal to her 
chosen task and accomplished fine 
work with a difficult text of three 
hundred pages. Surely she deserves 
more recognition. 
JOHN PAUL RUSSO 
University of Miami 
II dialogo de/la menzogna 
By M. A. Bonfantini and A. Ponzio. 
Bari-Roma: Millelire/Stampa 
Alternativa, 1993. 
This booklet is the published ver-
sion of a dialogue originally held 
between Bonfantini and Ponzio at the 
Conference on Lying, Deception and 
Simulation in Naples in February 
1992. This philosophical dialogue on 
lying (31 pages) makes its appearance 
as a piece of "alternative literature" 
with the publishers Millelire, and as 
such, is destined to an exceptionally 
wide and differentiated audience. 
Even more interesting is the fact that 
this volume has been adopted as a 
university course book, and, to the 
joy of students, all for the mere price 
of 1.000 lire-a provocative reply to 
dominant political and economic 
trends in Italy today, whose policies 
do not hesitate to penalize education. 
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The title of this booklet has a dou-
ble orientation: it refers to the perfor-
mance of a dialogue on lying which 
actually took place and which sets 
the question of lying as the object of 
discourse; and, as the expression 
"della menzogna" evidences on a 
grammatical level, it also refers to the 
dialogic character of lying itself, its 
constitutive dialogism, the dialogue 
that lying is. The authors describe, 
define, and analyze the art of decep-
tion through lying using the instru-
ments of pragmatist semiotics 
enriched with the semiotics of dia-
logue. But in addition to reaching an 
understanding of the structure, artic-
ulation, and functioning of lying 
behavior, the authors wish to attempt 
an evaluation of lying beyond the 
commonplace distinction between 
"good lies" and "bad lies", as is the 
usual qualification, which oversim-
plifies with reference to the ends to 
which they are formulated. This is an 
intriguing task, considering the ambi-
guity of lying: unlike stating a false-
hood whose opposite is stating the 
truth, lying does not have a precise 
opposite. As Bonfantini says, lying is 
morally and pragmatically ambigu-
ous. 
As the verb itself "mentire" indi-
cates, lying involves a dialogue artic-
ulated across various levels of dis-
course and thus implies the condition 
of plurality, distancing, and other-
ness. At the most obvious level, we 
have the sign-object of discourse, the 
lying referent on the one hand, and 
the metalinguistic sign declaring that 
the previous sign is lying, on the 
other. But for there to be an effective 
act of lying, we soon discover that the 
discourse levels, the sign-interpre-
tants or interpretant roles are in fact 
five (though a single subject may per-
form more than one role): beyond the 
referent and the liar, we have the sign 
considered to be true, the "dynamical 
object" in Peirce's sense, with respect 
to which it is established that the ref-
erent is a lie, the "victim" of lying 
discourse (a group of people, another 
person, oneself as another, etc.), and 
the addressee of the discourse 
unmasking the lie. 
Starting from the assumption that 
dialogism implies openness toward 
the other, and having ascertained the 
dialogic structure of lying, one might 
expect a positive evaluation of this 
particular figure of discourse. In real-
ity, with reference to their typology of 
dialogue as established in another 
volume, Dialogo sui dialoghi (Longo, 
Ravenna, 1986), the authors demon-
strate that lying classifies as a "dialo-
go di ottenimento," that is, as a dia-
logue aiming at achieving a specific 
end, and conducted with a view to 
concretely realizing a precise inten-
tion, according to given beliefs and 
convictions. As such, lying, where the 
truth is deceptively hidden with the 
intention of achieving a given pur-
pose, contains a relatively low level 
of dialogism and otherness. Contrary 
to the spirit of substantial dialogism, 
lying proves to be essentially mono-
logic given its orientation toward the 
selfish interests of identity, of the 
totality. The dialogic limit of lying, 
therefore, lies in the fact that the end 
to be achieved is imposed and exter-
nal with respect to the dialogic mech-
anisms of verification, scientific 
research and eventual modification. 
Truly dialogic discourse, says Ponzio, 
allows for the participation of the 
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other in its narrative project, is open 
to dialogic verification, gives "other-
ness" thematic status, and is thereby 
incapable of lying. In spite of its dia-
logic structure, the dialectic of lying 
is monologic and not dialogic, other-
ness and new knowledge being con-
sidered as a means used in achieving 
a given end and not as an end in 
themselves. 
Lying is achieved through the pro-
duction of messages intended to 
deceive. This statement points to the 
need of focusing attention on lying as 
an expression of intentionality. Only 
he who knows the truth can lie, oth-
erwise we have error or falsehood 
due to ignorance of the truth. In any 
case, falsehood and lying share the 
fact that both require a second level 
of discourse in order to establish that 
something is a lie, an untruth. 
Intentionally deceptive messages are 
conveyed and formulated through 
signs which may be verbal or nonver-
bal, or a mixture of both, unless we 
limit our attention to nonhuman ani-
mals. 
If, as Sebeok maintains, signs are 
not proper to human beings alone, 
but are also produced by nonhuman 
animals, then given that to use signs 
also means to know how to lie, an 
interesting question is whether ani-
mals lie. Sebeok addresses a series of 
studies to this issue: for example, the 
chapter "Can Animals Lie" in I Think 
I Am a Verb (Plenum Press, New York, 
1986; It. trans. by S. Petrilli, Sellerio, 
Palermo, 1990). Given the semiosic 
nature of lying, we soon realize that 
the capacity for lying is structural to 
both the human and non-human ani-
mal worlds, granting variation in the 
degree of "intentionality" involved. 
Prior to Eco, who defines semi-
otics as the discipline that studies 
what may be used for lying, Vailati 
had already registered the fact that 
signs may be used to deviate and to 
deceive as a consequence of their 
nonisomorphic relation to reality. 
And in 1907, he in fact reviewed 
Prezzolini's, L'arte di persuadere, with 
the title "Un manuale per i bugiardi." 
This aspect of Vailati' s research is 
examined by Ponzio in a paragraph 
entitled "Plurivocality, homology and 
lying" in a chapter devoted to the 
relation between Vailati and Rossi-
Landi (cf. Rossi-Landi e la filosofia del 
linguaggio, Adriatica, Bari, 1988: 195-
97). Cheating and lying, the ability of 
signs to deceive, deviate, disguise, 
pretend, or make believe, are fasci-
nating topics for anyone wishing to 
study sign life. The fact that a sign 
may refer to an absence, to a referent 
that is non-existent according to the 
modality of existence of a given uni-
verse of discourse (the designatum in 
Morris's sense), implies that the chain 
of deferrals characterizing semiosis is 
strong with the potential for decep-
tion, for lying, even if not manifest. 
Semiosis tells of the power of lying 
and lying tells of the power of semio-
sis. 
Following Bettetini in La simu-
lazione visiva (Bompiani, Milan, 1991), 
Bonfantini and Ponzio distinguish 
between "signifying simulation" and 
"signified simulation" and classify 
lying as an example of "bad signified 
simulation," by contrast with "good 
signified simulation" such as fiction. 
Reflection on the relation between 
simulation and lying involves con-
siderations on the relation between 
simulation and modeling devices, 
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simulation and the acquisition of 
knowledge, especially scientific 
knowledge. Furthermore, as a simu-
lation mechanism, lying is further 
qualified with respect to other forms 
of practical verbal behavior based on 
simulation such as keeping secrets, 
making errors, uttering unintentional 
falsehoods, ideology intended as 
false consciousness, and the distorted 
vision of reality, pretense, and fiction. 
Each of these different forms of simu-
lating behavior re.sembles truth, to 
which they relate iconically, as Peirce 
teaches us. However, beyond this 
common mark, Bonfantini and 
Ponzio, following Socrates, are main-
ly concerned with analyzing the dif-
ferences, and focus, for example, on 
the difference between lying and ide-
ology in its negative acceptation as 
false thought, false consciousness, 
false praxis. Here, the degree of con-
sciousness varies as to the ends regu-
lating these two forms of deceptive 
behavior, so that a distinction is made 
between acting or speaking according 
to a given ideology and pretending to 
act or speak according to a given ide-
ology, that is, lying. 
What may be contrasted to lying? 
Given the power of mass media, its 
all-pervasiveness, lying these days 
can no longer count on secrecy. In 
line with the times, the strategies of 
deceptive discourse have changed: 
ostentation, for example, serves as a 
means for revealing the truth, but 
without thematizing it, without 
allowing it to enter one's conscious-
ness: think of such episodes as Piazza 
Fontana, Brescia, Bologna, Moro, 
Ambrosoli, Ustica, Gladio, the Gulf 
War, Somalia! As our increasing 
awareness of interdependency be-
tween politics, power, and lying has 
made all too obvious, far from serv-
ing to denounce, to reveal the truth, 
ostentation is yet another device 
serving deception. The politics of 
transparency in Italy, "glasnost" in 
the former USSR, political correctness 
in the United States, all run the same 
risk-that of avoiding thematization 
and hiding the truth, of exchanging 
the transparency of surfaces, the 
apparent, for the complex and tor-
mented depths of reality. Recalling 
previous warnings from such intel-
lectuals as Anders, Pasolini, and 
Marx before them, we are now wit-
nessing the implementation of dis-
course strategies for hiding the truth 
which simply make the effort of lying 
unnecessary, superfluous. 
Having put into focus the decep-
tiveness of transparency and the 
silence of ostentation, what do 
Ponzio and Bonfantini propose as an 
alternative to the monologism of 
lying? Semiotica ai media (Adriatica, 
1984) and by Ponzio in Signs, 
Dialogue and Ideology (Benjamins, 
1993), dialogic participation in the 
choice of topics to be thematized is a 
possibility. In other words, without 
making impossible claims to objectiv-
ity, what we need is a broader basis 
for common decision-making con-
cerning truths to be revealed and 
understood, concerning priorities of 
community behavior: authentic dia-
logic choices involving responsible 
participation on the basis of the logic 
of otherness by contrast to the 
dulling of consciousness provoked by 
the redundancy of a world teeming 
with mystifying messages. 
SUSAN PETRILLI 
University of Bari 
